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ABSTRACT
The Mau Mau Uprising was a violent anticolonial struggle that took place in Kenya
between 1952 and 1960. During the Uprising, firearms were extremely difficult for Mau Mau
fighters to obtain. The few precision weapons they could acquire came from raided government
armories or those found on the battlefield. In order to make up the difference, the Mau Mau
leadership turned to resources that were more readily available and relied on the ingenuity of
their supporters. The result was a series of homemade firearms manufactured by Mau Mau
fighters and sympathizers. This thesis argues that homemade guns were a unique example of the
successful adaptation of firearms technology. In addition, the Mau Mau made the guns integral to
their military efforts. To this day, the guns hold a prominent place within Mau Mau historical
memory.
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INTRODUCTION
The Mau Mau Uprising was a violent anticolonial struggle that took place in Kenya
between 1952 and 1960. The British formed the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya out of their
East Africa Protectorate in 1920. As Kenya developed into a white settlement colony, Europeans
confiscated ancestral lands from Africans. During the period of decolonization that took place
after the Second World War, Kenya became a hotbed for political anticolonial activity,
particularly within the Kikuyu community. The Kikuyu were the largest tribal ethnicity within
Colonial Kenya. After decades of oppression, theft, and violence perpetrated by the British, the
Kikuyu movement known as Mau Mau rebelled against British colonial rule. The Mau Mau
sought the forceful expulsion of the British from Kenya in order to regain their land and
freedom. The British responded to the outbreak of violence by declaring a State of Emergency
on October 20, 1952.2
After the colonial government declared an emergency, firearms became extremely
difficult for Mau Mau fighters to obtain. The few precision weapons Mau Mau could acquire
came from raided government armories or guns found on the battlefield. In order to make up the
difference, the Mau Mau leadership had to arm their fighters in another way. They turned to
readily available resources and relied on the ingenuity of their supporters. The result was a
series of homemade firearms manufactured by Mau Mau fighters and sympathizers. This thesis
argues that homemade guns were a unique example of the successful adaptation of firearms
technology. In addition, the Mau Mau made the guns integral to their military efforts. To this
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day, the guns hold a prominent place within Mau Mau historical memory. Homemade guns
represent a concrete example of an oppressed people finding an uncommon way to obtain the
necessary firepower in order to confront their enemy.
To substantiate my argument, I developed a series of research questions. My research
started with a fundamental question. Why was it necessary for the Mau Mau to construct their
own firearms? During the era of decolonization, one can find any number of armed struggles for
independence. Yet, none of these conflicts feature an improvised firearm. Such rebellions and
revolutions were further complicated by the involvement of Cold War superpowers. The
superpowers often armed their chosen side with AK-47s or M-16s. The Mau Mau Uprising
stands outside this norm. Why was Mau Mau the exception and what other factors led to the
creation of homemade guns? The next set of questions I developed dealt with the technical and
mechanical aspects of the guns. Who designed the guns, how did Mau Mau source parts, and
how were the guns constructed? How prominent were the homemade guns as Mau Mau
weaponry? How important were the guns to the Mau Mau movement? These questions became
the foundation of my research. Their answers, naturally, led me to more questions.
Decolonization in Africa came on the heels of the Second World War. Many Africans
who fought in that war also fought for their own independence in the subsequent decades. This
drove me to ask, how did World War II affect Kenya and its people? How were Mau Mau
fighters influenced by that war? Did they receive training that helped them to develop the
homemade guns? The answers to such questions led me to the strategic and tactical implications
the firearms had on Mau Mau military efforts. Did the guns alleviate the KLFA’s chronic lack of
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manufactured precision weapons? How were they implemented at the small unit level? Did the
guns foster a dichotomy between the tactical effectiveness and the strategic goals of the KLFA?
Throughout my research, I found conflicting perspectives within the context of memory.
The conflicts made me curious about the overall historical memory of the homemade guns. How
have Mau Mau and British veterans remembered the homemade guns? How have their opinions
shaped historical memory? Is there a balance between their differing recollections that can
create a more accurate picture? The above questions guided my overall research and the
arguments of the thesis.

Historical Context for the Development of Mau Mau
The British settlement of Kenya began in earnest with the £6.5 million construction of the
Uganda Railway. Completed in 1901, it tied the Indian Ocean port of Mombasa to the interior
Lake Victoria. More important than the financial cost, British expansion into Kenya killed
thousands of, stole property from, and disrupted the lifeways of Africans who lived in the
railway’s path. Upon the railway’s completion, British Parliament concerned itself with ways to
recoup funds expended on the project. Great Britain charged the first commissioner of the
territory, Charles Elliot, with finding a solution. In Elliot’s opinion, the local African populace
was too sparse and uncivilized to form an economy around the railroad. Willing to seize more
land from indigenous Africans, Elliot and Parliament promoted white settlement of the colony as
a solution to their economic problem. The British government enticed white settlers from the
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metropole and South Africa with low interest loans, subsides, and long-term leases.3 The
Kikuyu people were the hardest hit by the influx of white settlers. Their ancestral lands were in
the highland region of Kenya. Not only did the highlands contain a long portion of the railway,
it was agriculturally and pastorally fertile. White settlers took the highlands for themselves and
forced a great number of Kikuyu into urban areas and reserves. In many ways, the grievances of
the Mau Mau began with the Uganda Railway and its ramifications.
As white settlement grew, the British codified theft and subjugation of the Kikuyu into
race-based laws. The regulations forced many more Kikuyu to leave their ancestral lands and
relocate into reserves and urban areas. Punitive taxation disenfranchised Kikuyu from
participation in elections. A pass and identification system restricted their freedom of
movement. And, to prevent Kikuyu from competing with white farmers, the British instituted
market restrictions on Kikuyu grown crops. Unable to freely compete for sales, many Kikuyu
turned to the tightly controlled urban wage labor market.4 The British rebranded the few Kikuyu
who stayed on their ancestral lands as “squatters.” Their land now controlled by white settlers;
Kikuyu resided on it at the pleasure of the new landowner. The landowners benefited from this
situation because they used the Kikuyu “squatters” as agricultural labor in a system akin to
feudalism or sharecropping. As white landowners embraced mechanized farming, however, they
forced many of the remaining Kikuyu into the overcrowded reserves and urban areas.5
Politically active Kikuyu pointed to such abuses as their chief complaints against the British. In
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1948, a group of Kikuyu swore a secret oath to forcibly remove the British and restore Kikuyu
land and freedom. Four years later, the Mau Mau began an open rebellion against British
colonial rule. To maintain the appearance of a domestic dispute, the British declared the
situation an emergency. In reality, this was a full-scale revolt by the Mau Mau and the British
response was one of a counter-insurgency.

Historiography of Mau Mau
The first historical works on Mau Mau came from the British and, primarily, served as
attempts to explain away and disparage the movement. These early works, written during the
Uprising, set the tone for the first few decades of scholarship. In addition to British scholars,
British military personnel who served in Kenya during the uprising contributed to the overall
tone of the early historiography. These biographical adventure histories, along with the official
British perspective, contributed greatly to the historiography. After Kenya’s independence, Mau
Mau adherents began to tell their version of the history of the event in the form of memoirs.
During the cultural turn, scholars of Mau Mau incorporated these memoirs into their own
research. Their groundbreaking research challenged the conventional narrative. Critical eyes
then turned toward activities of the British, while others discussed the Mau Mau in the larger
contexts of decolonization, nationalism, and memory. The present section highlights the
significant works that defined the trends and shifts of this historiography.
Considered official reports on the Mau Mau Emergency, early entries in Mau Mau
literature led with sensational titles and stories of savagery. Three works of particular interest
are Ione Leigh’s In the Shadow of the Mau Mau (1954), Ian McDougall’s African Turmoil
5

(1954), and C. T. Stoneman’s Out of Barbarism (1955).6 These three works exemplify the trend
of Mau Mau scholarship during the time of the Emergency. Each offers a similar arc and tone.
The authors began with a history of Kenya before the Mau Mau. Adoringly described as a
bountiful and peaceful place, the authors blissfully overlooked the draconian measures placed on
the indigenous population. The authors described the Kikuyu as loyal servants and hard workers
that suddenly turned on their paternal masters. The narratives then shifted to the conflict as it
was at the time of their writing. They invariably painted the Mau Mau as the aggressors,
deranged by an oath to a barbarous ideology. The authors were quick to point to violence on
behalf of the Mau Mau, describing events such as the Ruck family murders, but hesitate to
describe the rampant violence conducted at the hands of the British. From their perspective, the
severity of the British response was acceptable in order to crush the Mau Mau. Since these
authors wrote during the conflict, they concluded with a look forward. Generally, they
advocated for the traditional civilizing mission of Great Britain to help the Kikuyu move beyond
Mau Mau. Their point of view disregarded the legitimate grievances of Kikuyu and other native
Kenyans, thus helping to cement the perspective of the British on the Mau Mau narrative. Leigh,
however, did provide some space to hear from Mau Mau fighters. In one example, he reprinted
an excerpt from a manifesto written by a Mau Mau leader.7 While these works do not reflect
academic scholarship by today’s standards, they are important to the historiography of the Mau
Mau. Along with military and newspaper reports, they set the narrative’s tone for decades and
shaped the conventional history of the Uprising.
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Those who fought against the Mau Mau provided the next contribution to the
historiography. Ian Henderson grew up in the Central Province of Kenya. He spoke Kikuyu and
developed close ties with native Kenyans. As a member of Special Branch, he took part in raids
and arrests during the Emergency. In 1956, Henderson led a team to find Dedan Kimathi, one of
the last holdouts of the Mau Mau leadership. Henderson’s autobiography The Hunt for Kimathi
(1958) tells this story.8 Similarly, Bwana Drum (1964), written by Dennis Holman, tells the
story of David Drummond.9 He shares a similar background to Henderson and is responsible for
the capture and conversion of over forty Mau Mau fighters. Both men received acclaim and
praise at the time of their exploits. Later in life, Henderson found himself at the center of a
controversy regarding his methods as a member of Special Branch. Their books read like
adventure novels. Though they are not academic in nature, they are no less important to the
literature. Indeed, they represent a wider context for the historiography of the Mau Mau.
Because the British controlled the narrative in and out of academia, the Mau Mau entered
popular culture as a villain in tales of ‘real life’ heroism. Despite the potential for exaggerated
details and hyperbole, these works do have academic use. Both Henderson and Drummond
demonstrate respect for their foe, especially in terms of ingenuity and bush craft. On multiple
occasions, they mention the homemade firearms used by the Mau Mau, a unique aspect of
weaponry in this conflict. The voice and agency of the Mau Mau begins to grow with these
books as well. Kimathi has a miniature biography in Hunt and the converted Mau Mau are
integral to the narrative. Indeed, some go on to lead their own pseudo gangs.10 Though
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Henderson and Drummond are the filters for this information, these works take the Mau Mau
fighters beyond the mindless savage trope of earlier works. Moreover, having fought alongside
the Mau Mau, they were the first writers to describe them with such depth and respect.
When hostilities ceased in 1960, historical surveys of the Mau Mau Uprising began to
take shape. F. D. Corfield authored one of the first comprehensive works on the Mau Mau in the
years after the Uprising, but before independence. While he did not have the long perspective of
time, published in 1960, The Origins and Growth of Mau Mau went to great lengths in
explaining what happened in the preceding years. Unlike previous reports, such as Leigh or
Stoneman’s, Corfield used statistical analysis and other academic methods to attempt to explain
the Mau Mau. Despite this, he still holds a decidedly British point of view. Instead of beginning
with the romantic glory days of Colonial Kenya, though, he sought the roots of Kikuyu political
activity. His analysis of oathing is of keen interest. He does not dismiss the Kikuyu belief in the
power of an oath as an uncivilized belief in witchcraft. Instead, he uses it to inform his analysis
and explain the awesome power an oath had over a Kikuyu individual.11 Corfield’s work on
firearms is also valuable. In this chapter, he studies the data of lost and stolen precision weapons
to explain the firearm black market that the Mau Mau operated. He provides the first published
analysis of how many precision weapons the Mau Mau obtained during the conflict. He also
dedicates a portion of this chapter to the homemade firearms of the Mau Mau.12 He has some
preliminary numbers on how many of these homemade guns were in circulation and provides a
detailed description of their construction.13 Though he does not present direct analysis linking
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precision and homemade guns, one can see from the numbers that homemade guns were of
common use. In doing so, he demonstrates the agency and ability of the Mau Mau to forge their
own way when precision weapons became scarce.
Throughout the 1960s and 70s, a heavily debated form of scholarship entered the Mau
Mau discourse. These contributions came from the Mau Mau themselves. These works consist
of memoirs, autobiographies, and life histories that provided the point of view of the movement’s
adherents.14 In their time, Western and, even some, Kenyan scholars dismissed these writings as
biased, because these works contradicted the British-centric narrative of Mau Mau history. In
the late 1990s, Marshall S. Clough’s Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory, and Politics argued
that these narratives were crucial and valid contributions to the historiographical debate
surrounding the Mau Mau.15 To bolster his argument, he selected thirteen important works
written by various Mau Mau adherents. These narratives span twenty-five years and provide an
inclusive scope for his analysis. Clough’s cultural discourse analysis is an important
contribution. His is the first work to argue the Mau Mau point of view as a valid part of the
conversation. His methodology demonstrates how subaltern voices, previously barred from the
larger historical debate, are necessary for a more complete understanding of the event.
Arguably, his work created a pathway for the works of the twenty-first century that turned the
Mau Mau narrative on its head.
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In 2003, two high profile scholars of Kenyan and Mau Mau history came together and
produced an edited volume that attempted to highlight the Mau Mau movement’s contribution to
nationhood. E. S. Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale’s Mau Mau and Nationhood: Arms,
Authority, and Narration weaves this complex tale of national history by compiling contributions
from both veteran and trendsetting Mau Mau scholars.16 Earlier works discussed the role of
nationalism in the Mau Mau struggle, but this work surpasses them with intricacy and nuance.
Each author provides a chapter that exposes factors that demonstrate the Mau Mau’s contribution
to an independent Kenyan state. In doing so, these historians put forth a larger argument about
the similarities between Kenya’s struggle for national identity and other pluralistic states inside
and outside of Africa.17 Often, historians place Africa on the outside of world history’s narrative
of political modernity. The chapters within this edited volume demonstrate how the events of the
Mau Mau Uprising have parallels in other regions and nations. Mau Mau and Nationhood also
acts as an appetizer to the developing research methodologies and arguments put forth in the
early twenty-first century.
In 2005, two groundbreaking works on the Mau Mau Uprising changed the direction of
the historiography. The first of these contributions is by Caroline Elkins. Written over the
course of a decade, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya exposed
the atrocities that occurred within the British detention and rehabilitation camps. Prior to her
publishing, the narrative of this system suggested a successful civilizing mission on behalf of the
British. What she unearthed completely dispelled this myth. Rather than a small population of
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radicalized fighters in need of reform, she argues that the British detained about 1.5 million
people, or nearly the entire Kikuyu population, over the course of the Emergency.18 In addition
to compelling statistics, Elkins also complied innumerable stories of torture and abuse. She built
on the civil strife between Mau Mau and loyalists and, largely for the first time, exposed the
plight of Kikuyu women. Her findings were so controversial at the time, that some corners of
academia argued that she based her research on hearsay oral histories and made much of the
book up. Lawsuits filled by Mau Mau and Kikuyu survivors since the time of her book’s
publishing forced the declassification of many documents, thereby vindicating her work to
skeptics.19
The second groundbreaking book of 2005 was David Anderson’s Histories of the
Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. Like Elkins, Anderson exposed the
British side of the conflict. He based his research methods on the colonial court testimonies,
documents, and execution orders filled by the British for convicted Mau Mau fighters. Just like
the outrageous gulag system, he argues Britain also strayed from standard practices in the realm
of judicial capital punishment. According to court records used by Anderson, 1,090 Kikuyu
received the death penalty based on guilty verdicts at trial.20 This detail drove much of
Anderson’s research. Because of his work, Anderson acted as an expert witness in the lawsuits
discussed above.21 Both Elkins and Anderson gave voice and agency to the Mau Mau in a new
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and refreshing way. Much like the work of Clough, the Kikuyu point of view took a giant leap
forward in Mau Mau scholarship.
In the years since the publishing of Elkins and Anderson, Mau Mau scholarship has
continued this new trajectory. Three recent authors demonstrate different variations of this trend.
Daniel Branch’s Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and
Decolonization brings to the fore the Kikuyu loyalist.22 While the Mau Mau Uprising was, on
the surface, a rebellion against the British, this third group created an internecine struggle within
the Kikuyu community. While many loyalists did actively fight on behalf of the British, some
earned the title simply for refusing to support the Mau Mau. Branch’s work expertly details the
role and struggle of this sometimes-overlooked party. He also moves beyond the Uprising itself
and explains how political elites used these divisions to consolidate their power in an
independent Kenya.23
The second recent contribution comes from Myles Osborne. In the spirit of Clough, he
compiles Mau Mau memoirs, but instead of using multiple authors, he focuses on one individual.
The Life and Times of General China: Mau Mau and the End of Empire in Kenya uses the
various writings of Waruhiu Itote to tell Kenya’s story of decolonization.24 Itote was a prolific
writer and proud member of the Mau Mau. Osborne includes an abridged version of Itote’s
autobiography, a transcript of his interrogation and trial, his letters as a political figure in the
independent Kenyan government, and a eulogy from his funeral. In addition to these primary
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sources, Osborne provides historical analysis of the Mau Mau, Itote, and the documents
surrounding him. Though this is an edited volume of mostly primary sources, it makes an
important contribution to the broader historiography by providing a window into the life of a
man who played a large role on both sides of Kenyan independence. Historians of Mau Mau and
Kenya should value highly works such as this for the insights they can provide.
The third work is by Nick van der Bijl. His work titled The Mau Mau Rebellion: The
Emergency in Kenya 1952-1956 focuses on the shooting war from the point of view of the
British soldier.25 While much of the scholarship discusses the military aspects of the conflict,
few delve below the ranks of the senior staff and officers. Van der Bijl offers a comprehensive
work that illuminates this otherwise overlooked aspect of life during the Uprising. In many
ways, his work brings Mau Mau scholarship full circle. It began with the official top down
British perspective and, overtime, transitioned into the Mau Mau perspective. This latest
contribution returns to the British point of view, but with a bottom up twist. These three recent
works demonstrate the latest trends and methods of Mau Mau scholarship and offer great
opportunities for future work.
This thesis builds on these recent trends in Mau Mau historiography. It transcends the
conventional scholarship on the homemade guns by providing a systematic and comprehensive
account of the motivations for fashioning the guns as well as an analysis of their technical and
mechanical dimensions thus contributing to the broader literature of the history of technology.26
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In addition, the Second World War had great effects on Mau Mau leadership. Veterans of that
war fought on all sides of the Uprising and they add to the richness of the narrative. Therefore,
this work also contributes to the historiography of military and veterans’ history.27 As the very
individuals who dealt with the homemade guns firsthand, the words of Mau Mau adherents and
British soldiers strongly influenced this work. Thus, this thesis contributes to the historiography
of memory as well.28

Sources and Methodology
The foundational primary sources of this research are the homemade firearms themselves.
Currently the Imperial War Museum in London houses eleven such examples. The 1st Battalion
of the Royal East Kent Regiment, better known as the Buffs, obtained most of these examples
during the Emergency. The guns came to the United Kingdom as war trophies and now reside in
vast firearms collection maintained by the IWM. During the summer of 2018, I visited the IWM
and inspected eight of these eleven examples. The remaining three are on display at the IWM’s
Manchester location. Fortunately, the museum’s website has all eleven weapons as digital
exhibits.29 In addition to images of the weapons themselves, the site offers a description,
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historical context, and, when available, how the weapon came into the possession of the IWM.
During my time with the guns, I took numerous photographs, measurements, and detailed notes
regarding their composition and functionality.
While at the IWM, I also spent time in their reading room sifting through various
documents held in their archives. These included private papers compiled by individuals who
spent time in Kenya and interacted with Mau Mau. Their files contained notes, manuscripts, and
declassified intelligence reports. There were also propaganda magazines published by the
British that depicted brutal attacks by Mau Mau in graphic detail. Like Elkins, I saw little to
suggest any British wrongdoing, save a few vague newspaper clippings and a handwritten letter
from a detainee. Some of these private papers have corresponding oral histories, like that of
Terrance John Image. His and other oral histories are available on the IWM’s website.30
Listening to these firsthand accounts of British soldiers and civil servants amplified the detail of
the primary documents. For example, Image, as the commandant of a Mau Mau detention camp,
was the addressee of the detainee letter mentioned above. During his oral history, Image
discussed this letter and others like it.31 This firsthand research at the IWM was invaluable to
this thesis.
On the other hand, similar oral histories or private papers of former Mau Mau are not so
readily available. In order to overcome this gap in primary sources, I relied on memoirs written
by Mau Mau adherents. In this way, the voice of the Mau Mau is present throughout this work.
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I used Mau Mau memoirs to address their reasons for the need and construction of the guns, to
analyze the relationship of the Second World War and Mau Mau leadership, to determine the
homemade guns effects on Mau Mau tactics, and to place the guns within Mau Mau collective
memory. In order to check the bias of these writers, I regularly balanced their narratives against
academic secondary sources.

Organization
The homemade guns of the Mau Mau are an important and, heretofore, overlooked aspect
of the Mau Mau Uprising. In order to argue their importance, this thesis contains three chapters
of supporting evidence and analysis. Chapter One contains two sections. The first discusses the
relationship between the Second World War and the Mau Mau’s logistical ability to develop and
field the homemade guns. The second section argues why the Mau Mau saw a need to develop
homemade guns. Chapter Two also contains two parts. Part one details the technological
aspects of the homemade guns. The second part of the chapter analyzes the dichotomy that
existed between the tactical and strategic effectiveness of the guns. Finally, Chapter Three
endeavors to find a balance in the historical memory of the homemade guns.
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CHAPTER ONE: WORLD WAR II VETERANS IN MAU MAU
AND THE NEED FOR HOMEMADE GUNS
The colonial regime in which the Mau Mau movement existed influenced its
development and course. The goals of the movement are apparent in the name the fighters chose
for their army, The Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA). Kenya’s experience as a British
Colony in the Second World War and the difficulty of acquiring firearms during the Uprising
shaped the Mau Mau movement’s ability to achieve its goals. This chapter contains two parts.
The first discusses the African, Kenyan, and Kikuyu experiences in the Second World War. I
argue that the support roles that most Mau Mau veterans of World War II filled positioned them
well to develop homemade guns during their anticolonial struggle.. The second part of this
chapter focuses on why there were not enough manufactured guns within Kenya to arm the
KLFA. The Mau Mau attempted to overcome this need by developing homemade firearms.
Additionally, I argue the prominence and importance of the homemade guns to the Mau Mau
movement.

Part One: Kikuyu Kenyan Veterans of World War II and Mau Mau
The Second World War exacerbated the process of decolonization in Africa. To
understand the Mau Mau and their homemade firearms, an account of the Kikuyu Kenyan
experience in the Second World War is necessary. The following section attempts to do so by
broadly explaining the role of Africa and Africans in World War II; the use of the King’s African
Rifles (KAR), including a case study of the 11th Kenya Battalion; and an analysis of the support
role o most Kikuyu Kenyans during World War II. In doing so, I argue that the support role
17

filled by Kikuyu in World War II had a greater effect on the development of homemade firearms
during the Mau Mau Uprising than the rare instance of frontline training and combat in World
War II.

Africa and Africans in the Fighting of the Second World War
When global war broke out for a second time in the twentieth century, Africa was a
battleground as well as a source of men and materiel for the conflict. In some ways, the Second
World War began in Africa before any fighting took place in Europe. In October of 1935,
Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia, known to Europeans as Abyssinia.32 During the last decades of
the nineteenth century, Italy colonized a few African territories. In 1896, they attempted and
failed to colonize Ethiopia. Italy’s second campaign in 1935 was a brutal reprisal for its defeat
four decades earlier. Due to Ethiopia’s proximity to British East African colonies, Great Britain
quickly developed a response to Italian aggression. They established East Africa Command,
based in Nairobi, and then realigned existing colonial forces to repel a potential Italian invasion
from Ethiopia.33 Italy held Ethiopia until the British, using their African colonial forces, and
patriotic Ethiopians, led by Haile Selassie, removed the Italians and restored Ethiopian
sovereignty in 1941.34
Other African regions became embroiled in conflict as the Second Word War progressed.
North African territories, held by France and Great Britain, entered the war when Germany
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invaded France in 1940. When Paris fell in June of 1940, Brazzaville in French Equatorial
Africa, became the capital of Free France in exile. It was from this location that the Free French
amassed troops to march north into Vichy North Africa. 35 By 1941, the German army moved
into the Vichy French Territories of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Germany also sent troops to
Libya to support their Italian allies. In 1942, Allied Forces, including colonial troops, pressed
from Egypt in the east and Morocco in the west to squeeze the Axis powers out of North
Africa.36 By 1943, over half of the soldiers in the Free French Amy were tirailleurs, colonial
troops recruited from French West and Equatorial Africa.37
In all the campaigns in Africa, Africans themselves played important roles. Over a
million troops came from the continent, fighting under the flags of their respective imperial
powers. 38 Great Britain alone used over 500,000 African troops in the British army to fill
combat and support roles.39 They forced thousands more African civilians to produce food and
war materiel for the front. In Nigeria, the British forced 18,000 laborers to work in tin mines.40
In Kenya, the British installed a conscripted labor force that, by 1943, totaled over 18,000
civilians.41 White settlers in Kenya took advantage of British colonial policy during World War
II to force more Kikuyu off of ancestral lands and into reserves. When the Mau Mua rebelled in
the years after World War II, the reserves served as fruitful recruitment grounds for their cause.42
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Beyond the continent, Africans served in combat and support roles in the European,
Middle East, and Asian theaters of war.43 In Burma, for example, Great Britain sent three
African divisions, totaling 120,000 men, to fight the Japanese.44 Of these three divisions, it is the
11th East African Division (11th E. A.) that is most pertinent to this thesis, due to the roles of
members from subordinate units on both sides of the Mau Mau conflict. The 11th E. A. formed
in 1943, out of the 11th and 12th African Divisions. These two divisions were heavily involved in
the Abyssinian Campaign that removed Italian forces from Ethiopia.45 The 11th E. A. primarily
consisted of troops drawn from Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland (modern day Malawi), and
Tanganyika (modern day Tanzania). The backbone of the 11th E. A. was the KAR Regiment.
Within the regiment were battalions formed along colonial lines, i.e. the 11th Kenya Battalion
KAR, the 26th Tanganyika Battalion KAR, and the 44th Uganda Battalion KAR. At the brigade
level, though, the units mixed. Per the above examples, these three battalions formed the 25th
East African Brigade. The 11th E. A. had three such brigades, divisional artillery, engineers, and
various support units.46

The King’s African Rifles
The KAR formed in 1902. Originally, it was comprised of six battalions, five of which
came from pre-existing units. The British enforced a color line from the inception of the KAR.
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Officers were white Europeans and troops were black Africans. As time went on, the British
Army allowed Africans to fill some non-commissioned and junior officer ranks.47 The initial
purpose of the KAR was colonial security.48 Battalions formed based on colonial territory and,
only on rare occasions, did any mixing occur. Both colonial administrators and tribal chiefs
preferred this model. This practice remained in place up through the 1950s.49 The KAR saw
action in both World Wars and fought against the Mau Mau.
At the start of the Second World War, the KAR comprised seven battalions, which
contained 2,900 men. As rifle battalions, their chief role still focused on colonial security and,
after 1935, maintaining a sharp eye on Italian activity in Ethiopia. By the wars end, the KAR
grew to forty-three battalions of over 323,000 African soldiers that served all over the globe.50
The KAR increased to such levels due to a massive recruiting campaign. For the most part,
Britain did not use blatant conscription to fill the ranks of the KAR.51 Instead, recruiters used
coercive means to fill recruit quotas. The use of coercion over conscription allowed Great
Britain to deny allegations of force to fill the ranks. Coercion tactics included pressuring tribal
chiefs, the lure of adventure and money, the use of propaganda broadcasts and films, and
offering the chance to prove one’s manhood.52 With the exception of soliciting tribal chiefs,
these recruiting tactics were more severe versions of those used to recruit white soldiers into the
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British army. When the British used outright conscription, it targeted educated and literate
Africans to fill technical positions within the KAR. This demographic was less inclined to join
the army due to coercive means. Educated and literate Kenyans had greater opportunity in
civilian life as compared to the less educated and illiterate. As previously mentioned, the British
relied on conscription to create a massive African civilian labor force.53

The 11th Kenya Battalion of the King’s African Rifles
In 1946, the 11th Kenya Battalion KAR (11th KAR) published a unit history. The
experiences of this battalion provide a historical basis for the stories of glory and valor that many
Mau Mau generals claimed as their own. The battalion formed in early 1941. Recruits from
Kenya formed most of the companies, though there was some supplementation of recruits from
Uganda.54 The 11th KAR first saw action when they quelled fighting in Somalia after the defeat
of the Italians in 1941.55 During 1942, they returned to Kenya for further training. It was at this
time that the 11th KAR upgraded from a group of rifle companies to a fully equipped front-line
battalion. This meant the addition of mortar and machine gun sections, as well as specialist
units.56 Future Mau Mau leaders claimed this training as their first exposure to real weapons and
tactics. In mid-1943, the 11th KAR sailed to Ceylon (modern day Sri Lanka).57 Ceylon served as
a staging and training area for their eventual deployment to the Burma Front.
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The Allied goal in Burma was to wrest control of the area from the Japanese and restore
an overland route to China.58 While in Burma, the 11th KAR encountered the enemy several
times. According to the unit history, their first major engagement occurred at a place called
Habari Hill. During a patrol of the area, a patrol from B Company came across an enemy
position. The company sent additional patrols to support them. A firefight ensued as the
Japanese withdrew to a stronger position, leaving behind a weapon and supply cache. Over the
next few days, as A and C Companies joined B, the 11th KAR cleared out the Japanese and
renamed the area Jambo Hill.59
The patrols, ambushes, counter-ambushes, and defensive tactics used by the 11th KAR to
defeat the Japanese on Jambo Hill were, in their nature, the same as what the Mau Mau forest
fighters used on Mount Kenya and the Aberdares. But how many future Mau Mau trained and
fought as infantrymen in the Second World War?

Kikuyu and WWII Support Roles
Waruhiu Itote, the future Mau Mau General China, was a member of the 36th Tanganyika
Battalion, KAR. He too served in Burma; however, not as an infantryman. Despite his own
boasts, he was a mess steward, likely attached to the 36th KAR from the East African Military
Labor Service (EAMLS).60 Due to the nature of jungle warfare, though, it is entirely possible he

58

Jackson, The British Empire and the Second World War, 351.
Birkbeck, 11th KAR History, 11-13.
60
Timothy Parsons, “Mau Mau's Army of Clerks: Colonial Military Service and the Kenya Land and Freedom
Army in Kenya's National Imgination,” Journal of African History 58, no. 2 (2017), 298. According to Parsons,
Itote coming from EAMLS explains how a Kikuyu Kenyan was a member of a Tanganyika battalion. Unit cohesion
was unlikely to be negatively affected because, on paper at least, a mess steward would not be on the front line with
the regular infantrymen.
59

23

experienced combat, as he claims in his memoir. He discusses the ferocity of the enemy, the
spirit of men in combat, and the harsh jungle terrain.61 His experience alludes to an important,
and according to Timothy Parsons, overlooked aspect of Mau Mau veterans of World War II.
Few Kikuyu, and even fewer Mau Mau leaders, trained and fought as infantrymen in the Second
World War. Most of Mau Mau veterans of World War II served in non-combatant support
units.62
The reason for the lack of Kikuyu as infantrymen goes back to British recruiting practices
within Kenya. Two race-based factors framed the British recruitment of Africans in Kenya. The
first dealt with white Kenyan leadership. Kenya was a settler colony and, as such, the
maintenance of white rule was paramount. British settlers were concerned with military-trained
Africans, especially the Kikuyu, within their midst. It was within the Kikuyu ancestral lands that
most white Europeans settled. Because of Kikuyu proximity to the white population, colonial
leadership pushed for the recruitment of Kikuyu and other nearby tribes into labor and support
units.63 The second factor dealt with the British belief in the colonial paradigm of martial races.
This was the belief that certain tribes and peoples were predisposed to warfare and others were
not. The British military believed that unlike the Kamba people, for example, the Kikuyu were
not of the build or disposition for combat. In addition, many Kikuyu were literate and educated
in colonial schools. This meant the British saw the Kikuyu as well suited to clerical and
logistical duties.64 While Parson’s work goes a long way to dispel the myth of the World War II
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infantrymen turned Mau Mau warrior, it also helps explain the occurrence of homemade
firearms.
Pulling the trigger of a homemade firearm at close range does not depend on extensive
tactical military training. Their conception and construction are the remarkable aspects of these
weapons. The ability to field such a firearm relies on the resources to build and distribute it.
Gun makers constructed homemade firearms from pieces of local infrastructure. A major
necessity for funneling these parts from urban areas to gun factories in the forests were
individuals trained in logistics. Once the parts arrived, skilled mechanics were necessary to
design and construct the guns. The Mau Mau relied on logistics once again to distribute these
guns to the fighters in the field. All the while, administrative oversight helped ensure
organization and accountability. Logistics, mechanics, and administration were the support
positions that educated Kikuyu individuals filled during the Second World War.
As members of the EAMLS and the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps (AAPC), Mau Mau
leaders trained in the unsung skills of warfare. Some, like Itote, found themselves attached to
front line units, such as the 11th and 36th KAR. In the process, the terrain and the enemy blurred
the line between combatant and noncombatant. In the jungle, without proper infantry training,
they developed some ability to survive and fight. Other Mau Mau leaders who served in the
EAMLS and the AAPC stayed within Kenya. In the process, they gained knowledge of the
British military’s standards and practices. This was invaluable knowledge to have during the
Uprising, as the Mau Mau fought the British army and the KAR. No doubt, many Mau Mau
fighters exaggerated their experiences in World War II to gain prestige and leadership roles.
Whatever experience they gained, glorious or unsung, helped in their struggle for land and
25

freedom. More specifically, though, their training in the support aspects of war greatly
facilitated the Mau Mau’s ability to produce homemade firearms.

Part Two: The Need for Homemade Guns
It was in the immediate post-World War II years that the Mau Mau movement began in
Kenya. Their numbers were small in the beginning, which meant theft or illegal purchase of
firearms was enough to arm Mau Mau fighters. Henry Kahinga Wachanga, who served as a Mau
Mau General Secretary from 1952 to 1955, describes such procurement methods in his 1975
autobiography. As Wachanga recalls, Mau Mau raiders targeted the shops and homes of nonAfricans. The Mau Mau then funneled the stolen weapons to the forests for disbursement among
the troops.65 Waruhiu Itote, better known by his nom de guerre General China, boasted of
stealing seven guns by himself prior to 1952.66 However, a few factors developed as the
Uprising went on that made such methods insufficient. The growth of the Mau Mau movement,
the effective counterinsurgency tactics of the British, and the lack of an outside state sponsor to
supply weapons challenged the Mau Mau ability to arm KLFA fighters. This section will focus
on those factors, as well as argue the prominence and importance of the homemade guns used to
overcome such challenges.
Much of the specific information about these homemade guns comes from the
autobiography and interrogation of Itote. As a general, he was a ranking member of the Mau
Mau movement. Itote commanded KLFA in the Mount Kenya and Nyeri sectors, second only to
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the supreme military leader of the movement, Dedan Kimethi.67 As a young man, Itote fought
for the British in World War II as part of the 36th King’s African Rifles (KAR). Stationed in
Tanganyika (present day Tanzania), the unit deployed to Ceylon (present day Sri Lanka) for
training. Itote saw combat in Burma, as the KAR was integral to the Allied effort in expelling
the Japanese from the British colony.68 According to Itote, it was his time serving abroad that
began his questioning of colonial rule. In the beginning of his autobiography, Mau Mau
General, Itote recalls two seminal conversations in his life. The first occurred with a white
English soldier. They talked of nationalism and the war effort. The English soldier suggested
that Itote reconsider his motivations for fighting with the British to secure their empire. The
second conversation was with an African American soldier. They talked of Christianity and of
identity. Itote claims he had many more conversations like these during the war, but these two
talks caused him to begin identifying as a Kenyan and opening his eyes to a wider world.69 This
foundation helped to place Itote in a position of leadership within the movement and as an
authority on its homemade guns.

Not Enough Guns to Go Around
According to Itote, it was the growth of their movement and the commencement of
attacks on Europeans that drove the demand for guns beyond the black market and theft.70 In
addition to growth of the Mau Mau, the weapons supply within the cities began to dry up.
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Colonial government forces recognized how the Mau Mau obtained precision weapons and made
efforts to clamp down on the sources. In round up operations, such as Operation Jock Scott,
colonial government forces casted a wide net and pulled Mau Mau leadership and any suspected
supporters off the street.71 The colonial government also set up checkpoints in order to stop and
search anyone suspected of Mau Mau sympathies. The British did not exclude Kenyan women
from these tactics. Indeed, many Kikuyu women were members of the Mau Mau Passive
Wing.72 This was the Mau Mau support element that worked in urban areas and the reserves. In
addition to smuggling weapons, the Passive Wing moved information, food, and other supplies
to the Militant Wing, the fighters in the forest.73 To effectively search those suspected of being
Mau Mau, the British enlisted European and African women into the Kenya Police Reserve.74
Another constraint on the supply of precision firearms was the lack of external support
for the Mau Mau movement. Within the context of the Cold War, it was common for rebellions
to ally themselves to larger ideologies. In doing so, they garnered favor from the two global
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Mau Mau was an exception to this
standard. There are several reasons for this isolation. First off, this was a rebellion in a British
colony in Africa. Because of long-standing political relationships, the U.S. feared that
supporting such a rebellion would undermine British colonial authority. Ebere Nwaubani, in his
book The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960, argues that the United
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States had a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the European colonial powers in Africa.75
Secondly, even though certain Kenyan leaders spent time in the Soviet Union, the Russians
viewed the Mau Mau “as an alienated and backward tribal uprising.”76 This was also prior to the
Khrushchev policy of supporting all African liberation struggles. This policy came into effect in
1961, when Kenya was already on the path to a negotiated independence from Great Britain.77
British authorities were aware that the Mau Mau enjoyed no Soviet support and did their best to
suppress any rumors to the contrary. It was in the British interest to maintain the perception that
this was a domestic dispute instigated by tribal upstarts. Thus, the British decision to call the
situation in Kenya an emergency and not a rebellion, revolt, or war. In their opinion, increased
global attention or involvement could only exacerbate a tenuous situation. When it came to the
supply of arms, the Public Relations Office in Nairobi rebuffed all claims and rumors of Soviet
supply.78 The Mau Mau also could not rely on supply from neighboring African states and
territories. At the time, Ethiopia was the only independent African state adjacent to Kenya.
According to General China, he sent teams to smuggle weapons and ammunition into Kenya
from Ethiopia, but these attempts were perilous and often unsuccessful. Ethiopian border troops
engaged these teams, costing lives and time.79 The remaining territory surrounding Kenya
comprised of colonies controlled by Great Britain and Italy. The aforementioned factors,
combined with Mau Mau oathing procedures and brutal tactics, isolated the movement from
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external support. It was in this environment that General China and other Mau Mau leaders
began to develop homemade firearms.

Prominence and Importance of the Homemade Guns
In January 1954, General China led some of his men to a weapons cache in order to
rearm. Prior to obtaining the weapons, colonial police and KAR troops engaged this contingent
of Mau Mau. Shot during the firefight, China had little choice but to surrender to the KAR
troops.80 Shortly after his capture, China underwent a lengthy interrogation conducted by
Assistant Superintendent of Police Ian Henderson. Henderson was uniquely qualified to perform
this duty. Though he was a European by birth, his parents raised him in Nyeri. As a youth, he
became fluent in the language of the Kikuyu.81 During the Uprising, he worked with Special
Branch. His chief mission was to infiltrate Mau Mau gangs and persuade them to turn to the side
of the Government. His interrogation of General China led to the greatest understanding of Mau
Mau movements and organization that the British would have during the conflict.
Per his interrogation, China claimed his factory produced an average of forty-two rifles
per week at the time of his capture.82 Based on this rate of production and additional information
divulged by China, Henderson put the total number of homemade guns in the Mount Kenya
region at 1,250. This estimation placed homemade guns at seventy-five per cent of all Mau Mau
firearms in the area.83 Indeed, one should avoid applying these numbers directly to all the areas
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that the Mau Mau operated. This high percentage does suggest, however, that homemade guns
were by far the most prominent firearm issued to the Mau Mau fighter.
It is clear from the source material that Mau Mau fighters, such as General China, were
extremely proud of their achievement in arms production. From the perspective of Mau Mau
leadership, the homemade guns were necessary in order to offer any level of resistance to the
British. On the other side of the conflict, though, it appears that a change in the British
perception of these guns has occurred over time. Primary sources from the time and immediately
after the Uprising show an appreciation for these weapons, at least for their lethality if not their
ingenuity. Indeed, the British featured these weapons in anti-Mau Mau propaganda.84
Since the end of hostilities, non-Kenyan writers overlooked the weapons. They were no
longer tools of war but labeled as ceremonial and symbolic.85 The first works on the topic of
Mau Mau focused on the British end of the struggle. Indeed, many of these books came out
during the Emergency itself. Leigh’s In the Shadow of the Mau Mau, McDougall’s African
Turmoil, and Stoneham’s Out of Barbarism all paint a picture of African savagery and British
civility. Works, such as these, helped to establish the early narrative of Great Britain crushing
the rebellion of the Mau Mau and establishing the required level of civilization for an
independent Kenya. The homemade guns do not make any real appearance in these works.
Potential reasons for this could be a lack of awareness by the authors or a willingness to overlook
any level of skill in their adversary.
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The homemade firearms gained prominence in British writing with the debut of
biographies and autobiographies of individuals who fought the Mau Mau. The most prominent
of such works is the autobiography of Ian Henderson. In addition to his interrogation of General
China, Henderson pursued Dedan Kimathi, the military leader of the Mau Mau. This search is
the focal point of his book, coauthored by Philip Goodhart, entitled The Hunt for Kimathi.
Henderson had a keen awareness and combatant’s appreciation for these guns. During his
pursuit of men like China and Kimathi, he engaged with Mau Mau fighters. On at least one
occasion, he received a gunshot wound in his left arm.86 Statistically speaking, this bullet very
likely came from a homemade gun. In a more peaceful interaction with a group of Mau Mau
fighters, Henderson offered a detailed description and analysis of these homemade firearms.
“Some were homemade guns which had been manufactured with an undisputed ingenuity from
length of piping, bicycle frames, and scraps of wire and metal they had found lying about the
countryside, but these were often more dangerous for the man who fired them than their
target.”87 This single sentence says a great deal. First, Henderson acknowledges the ingenuity of
these guns. He used similar terms previously heard from General China. This is at least one
example of a European appreciating these African firearms. Second, he corroborates China’s
description of materials used to make the guns. This suggests that the components were
recognizable in their new form. Last, Henderson reaffirms their danger to the shooter.
Potentially, this meeting took place early on, before the weapons became safer. Another, more
likely, possibility is that the stigma of danger remained attached to these weapons despite
improvements.
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Four years after the Emergency ended, another book written about a British officer whose
mission was to infiltrate the Mau Mau debuted. Entitled Bwana Drum, it told the story of David
Drummond. The author, Dennis Holman, conducted extensive interviews with Drummond and
his associates in order to write this book. Holman tells the stories of gun factory raids, provides
a complete description of homemade guns, and states that the rank and file Mau Mau fighter
carried a homemade gun. Indeed, it was this type of weapon that they most associated with their
movement, allowing them to identify as a true forest fighter.88 In addition, Holman makes it
clear that Drummond regarded the importance of homemade guns when he sent out teams to
infiltrate Mau Mau units. A key aspect to the team blending in were the improvised guns.
Drummond recognized that a lack of homemade guns would give them away as outsiders.89
Both works provide excellent firsthand accounts of engagements with the Mau Mau. In
many respects, they are the British versions of Itote’s autobiography. In that regard, it is
plausible to assume some hyperbole and exaggeration of events. Envisioning these works as a
Venn diagram, though, helps to elucidate some potential truths. All three demonstrate great
respect for homemade guns as weapons. There is no discussion of them as ceremonial pieces.
Both Itote and Henderson make extremely similar descriptions of these weapons. In Holman and
Itote, the pride the fighters have for these guns is apparent. In many ways, the homemade gun is
the Mau Mau calling card. Such commonalties make clear the prominence and importance of
homemade guns as tools of war in the Mau Mau Uprising.
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The homemade guns manufactured by the Mau Mau are an important example of agency
on behalf of an oppressed people. Those committed to the Mau Mau cause found a unique way
to obtain items that they otherwise could not. They did not have an external state sponsor to
supply their cause with arms and aid. The firearm restrictions in place in Colonial Kenya
effectively disarmed them before there was a rebellion. Once in a state of emergency, the
regulations tightened further, effectively shutting down the black market. Resorting to theft did
not cover the gap. Where similar initiatives might have crumbled, the Mau Mau found another
way. They rapidly developed and constructed their own firearms. Production was large enough
that these guns became the primary firearms of the KLFA fighter. As such, these weapons
helped to dictate both Mau Mau and British tactics. They also hold an important place in Mau
Mau memory as a unique example of improvised weaponry.
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CHAPTER TWO: MAU MAU HOMEMADE GUN
TECHNOLOGY AND TACTICS
The Mau Mau created a unique weapon in their homemade guns. They used local
resources to source parts and constructed the guns in factories deep in the forest. Once in the
hands of Mau Mau fighters, the homemade guns influenced the type of tactics employed by
KLFA. The following chapter contains two sections. The first section details the technological
aspects of the homemade firearms, namely their sourcing, construction, and mechanics. The
section also details how the Mau Mau overcame ammunition and explosives shortfalls. The
second section focuses on the chronic precision firearms shortage during the Uprising. It argues
that this shortage drove Mau Mau operations to procure more weapons and, in the process, their
homemade guns tactically influenced how the Mau Mau carried out these operations.

Part One: Homemade Gun Technology
In order to understand how the Mau Mau used their homemade guns, it is important to
explain the technology behind the guns. Using Mau Mau logistical channels, gun parts traveled
to factories in the foothills and forests. Within the factories, engineers constructed and tested
homemade firearms. This section details the methods the Mau Mau used to source parts for their
homemade guns. It also describes the construction process and the mechanical operation of the
guns.
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Sourcing, Construction, and Mechanics
According to General China’s autobiography, in early 1953 the idea to construct firearms
occurred to him and his comrades.90 Because even the parts to make firearms were so difficult to
come by, these gun makers looked to resources more readily at hand. China described the
sourcing for these parts in the following way:
The stock itself was fashioned from the wood of the Muthiti or Thirikwa tree,
which never cracks under any weather conditions. The barrel, generally made
from water pipe, was fastened to this, and a smaller pipe or piece of iron, one
which would fit smoothly within the barrel, was used as a hammer. The hammer
was released by a mechanism built out of a barbed wire spring and a piece of car
or bicycle tube.91
The components of these homemade guns came from sources readily found in Kenya’s natural
and urban environments. Itote also speaks to the ingenuity of these gun makers. From easily
found items, the manufacture of rifles, shotguns, and pistols took place. Though rudimentary in
their parts, combining them created a simple to use and lethal weapon.
The examples of these homemade guns housed at the IWM in London corroborate
China’s description (See Figure 1).92 They present a good cross section of the types of firearms
made by the Mau Mau. They all feature a hard-wooden stock and a smooth bore barrel made of
water or gas pipe. The seven rifles inspected have an average overall length of 91.14 cm. The
average barrel length is 44 cm. All but two fire with a “sling-shot” method. That is to say, the
operator pulls a bolt or firing pin back against a spring or rubber strap and releases the pin to fire
the round. Most contain a feature to hold a loaded round in place. This is typically a metal clip
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or collar slipped over the end of a cartridge. They all lack sights for target acquisition, thus
suggesting a short-range point and shoot type weapon. These limitations go well with
Wachanga’s descriptions of Mau Mau ambushes.93

Figure 2: Example of simple Mau Mau homemade firearm.94

Their inherent danger to the shooter is also apparent. The combination of water pipe and
smooth fitting iron may effectively ignite a cartridge, but a misfire was also possible. A misfire
can occur when there is an improper seal around the cartridge, allowing gas and fire to escape the
firing chamber. Such an event could cause these weapons to explode, potentially injuring the
operator. This danger is more apparent when one examines the specific pipes used to construct
the barrels. One such example housed at the IWM uses a length of seamed pipe for the barrel.95
As opposed to pipe milled as a tube from the start, seamed pipe starts as a flat strip. A metal
worker bends the strip into a circular tube and then welds the tube at the seam.96 This creates a
serviceable water pipe, but a structurally weak gun barrel. It is no surprise that this particular
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example has a barrel rupture in the firing chamber. China was extremely aware of these dangers,
particularly with the early models. Due to the danger and lack of durability over time, standard
practice required that each gun only fire twenty-five rounds.97 It is unclear if an armorer refit or
destroyed the firearm at this point. One suspects that, due to the severe shortage of firearms, all
salvageable parts from a gun were repurposed to a new weapon. The severity of punishment for
the loss of a firearm and the Mau Mau’s attention to firearm maintenance and cleanliness helps
to substantiate this assessment.98
After the construction of some prototypes, China opened a gun factory at his headquarters
on Mount Kenya. According to his description, he began this operation with twenty engineers
and added to their ranks from the companies under his command. An individual named Ruku
served as the foreman and production of these guns became rapid and, somewhat, standardized.99
Overtime, China increased the number of engineers and innovations took place. The most
common innovation was an improved trigger mechanism. The IWM has two examples of such
an improvement.100 Instead of the “sling-shot” method of igniting a round, these examples
involve triggers and springs that release the firing pin into the cartridge. In lesser numbers,
China’s factory developed magazine fed rifles.101 The IWM has a few examples of magazine fed
rifles but describes the magazine of at least one as a “dummy.” This particular weapon, though,
constructed by Simon Peter Ngatia Macharia (General Doctor Russia), may not have been made
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under the direction of General China (See Figure 2). 102 The magazine area is lacking a spring to
elevate the next round into the firing chamber. It is possible that this weapon once contained a
spring that is now missing. This weapon also shows another level of sophistication. It contains a
working bolt action with a firing pin. While most of the weapons viewed at the IWM rely on a
nail secured by a spring or rubber strap to strike a round, this one conceals the striker in a bolt
(See Figure 3). This creates a safer firing mechanism than other examples and demonstrates a
sophisticated level of engineering.

Figure 3: Mau Mau homemade firearm, built by General Doctor Russia, with “dummy magazine.”103

Figure 4: Mau Mau homemade bolt and firing pin, built by General Doctor Russia.
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Of note is the homemade pistol housed at the IWM (See figure 4).105 General China
considered pistols too unsafe to the shooter. On his orders, gunmakers manufactured very few
pistols.106 The pistol held at the IWM is an apparent exception. It is a hybrid of homemade and
premanufactured parts. It features a rifled barrel from a .22 caliber pistol. Based on the barrel’s
style and length, it likely came from a revolver. It has a front sight, unlike the other homemade
weapons found at the IWM. The barrel rests on a hinge, which swings open “shotgun style” in
order to load a round. The weapon also contains a premanufactured hammer, possibly from the
same initial weapon that the barrel came from. The stock and grip are original parts carved from
wood. It also features a functioning trigger and safety. One speculates that this piece belonged
to a high-ranking individual, as it is a handgun and made from premanufactured parts.

Figure 5: Mau Mau homemade pistol.107
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Ammunition and Explosives
While the Mau Mau saw great success in constructing their own firearms, an obstacle that
was more difficult to overcome was the acquisition of ammunition. The design of their
homemade guns called for a modern cartridge, just as European manufactured firearms did.
After the British declared a state of emergency, if colonial authorities found an African in
possession of even a single round of ammunition the punishment was death.108 Such a danger
heightened the scarcity of available ammunition for the Mau Mau to obtain. In the beginning of
the Uprising, gunmakers test fired homemade guns before issuing them to fighters. As
ammunition scarcity grew, this practice ended.109
According to China, the Mau Mau could not produce their own ammunition as they did
firearms.110 They also did not have the capability to reload spent rifle and pistol casings with
new projectiles and propellant. British service rifles of the time primarily fired a .303 caliber
rifle round. This made the .303 the most common type of ammunition in the area. Therefore,
Mau Mau gun makers endeavored to build firearms to support this caliber round. The British
were aware of this fact and placed ammunition security at the highest priority.111
Theft and the black market did supply some relief, but the Mau Mau employed a few
more creative ways to overcome the ammunition shortage. Primarily, the Mau Mau filed down
larger ammunition or packed wading around smaller ammunition to fit their homemade weapons.
The second path they pursued worked best for shotgun ammunition, as it was easier to
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manipulate without negatively affecting its use. Engineers at China’s gun factory would open a
shotgun cartridge and remove a portion of its gunpowder within. They would then use it to fill
other shotgun shells, making up the difference with crushed glass.112 According to Wachanga,
Dedan Kimathi ordered gun makers to mix ground up ivory into their gunpowder. Kimathi
claimed that doing so would ensure their rounds fired properly.113 Perhaps this was superstition,
as there does not appear to be a practical reason behind this method. The most elaborate tactic
involved spent casings found after a battle. China, and likely other commanders, directed
fighters to retrieve these valuable objects. They would then trade the empty brass for fresh
ammunition with KAR troops who were sympathetic to the Mau Mau cause. The KAR troops
would conceal the transaction by claiming they consumed all their rounds in a firefight and
needed to restock on ammunition.114
In addition to manufacturing firearms and modifying ammunition, Mau Mau engineers
constructed hand grenades. According to Wachanga, engineers would fill a can with
“gunpowder, broken glass, stones, and petrol.”115 They then inserted a flammable wick for
ignition. Thus, creating a particularly nasty improvised explosive device. It is likely that this
device would vary in size. Smaller cans, such as soup or vegetable cans, lent well to hand
grenades. Larger cans created larger explosives. Wachanga claims the lethal range of these
hand grenades was forty square yards.116 If this is an accurate assessment, these improvised
hand grenades were much more lethal than a modern hand grenade. A modern hand grenade has
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a lethal range of about 6 square yards.117 It is probably more accurate to describe Wachanga’s
forty square yard estimate as the weapon’s casualty producing radius. The casualty radius is the
range in which the density of shrapnel exploding out from the grenade is enough to cause serious
injury. Regardless of the specifics, these were lethal weapons used to good effect by the Mau
Mau, particularly in tight quarters and ambushes.118

Part Two: How Firearm Acquisition and Homemade Guns Dictated Tactics
As an insurgency, the people and resources the Mau Mau could bring to their cause
limited their strategic goals. Plainly, their primary goal aimed at the restoration of Kikuyu land
and the independence of Kenya. To understand their enemy, the British military published the
Handbook on Mau Mau Operations. In it, the British offered their definition of Mau Mau
strategic goals, which “is to expand the security threat to an extent which will be beyond the
capacity of Government to contain. The strategical aim has the ultimate objective of forcing
Government to meet Kikuyu political demands.”119 To this end, the Mau Mau movement
comprised a Militant Wing and a Political Wing. Initially, the Political Wing led the movement
towards it strategic aims. Mau Mau’s political leaders laid an ideological foundation in the years
leading up to the declaration of the Emergency.120 Early colonial government action targeted
and then arrested men believed to be Mau Mau political leadership in Operation Jock Scott.
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Thus, the heads of the Militant Wing, already operating in the forests, were the only leaders left
in the field. From this point on, the Militant Wing began to direct the movement.121
The Handbook on Mau Mau Operations also provides a definition for the tactical goals of
the Mau Mau: “to expand its military forces and deploy them to the extent necessary to achieve
the strategical aim.”122 The following section focuses on the Militant Wing’s ability to prosecute
these tactical aims. It argues that the procurement and construction of firearms became a chief
focus of Mau Mau tactical operations outside of the forest, therefore limiting the ability to
achieve strategic aims overtime. Woven throughout this section are British counter-insurgency
efforts to curtail these operations.

Battles for Weapons to Fight More Battles
As early as 1948, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), a political predecessor to the
Mau Mau movement, began stockpiling arms and ammunition. The British banned the KCA at
the outset of the Second World War in an attempt to consolidate power within the colony. Postwar, certain members of the KCA saw an armed rebellion as the only way to gain Kenyan
independence. KCA members and sympathizers exploited lax ammunition dump security and
poorly enforced firearm laws to obtain these items. They acquired nearly 400 firearms and well
over 100,000 rounds of ammunition between 1948 and 1952.123 When the British government
declared the a state of emergency in 1952, new firearm laws went into effect. At the same time,
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though, the civilian populace increasingly carried firearms for protection. Mau Mau and Kikuyu
sympathetic to the movement targeted these people and their homes to obtain firearms.124
According to Waruhiu Itote, Mau Mau youths preferred the rural homes of Europeans.
At the point of a panga, many Europeans surrendered their firearms without a fight. Itote goes
on to brag that he personally acquired seven weapons in 1952 in this manner.125 Itote often
overemphasizes Mau Mau exploits, but the scenario he describes is plausible. The statistics in
Corfield’s Origins and Growth of Mau Mau demonstrate the Mau Mau ability to obtain stolen
weapons in the beginning of the Uprising, even if they had a difficult time holding on to them.
Government authorities recovered the majority of weapons lost or stolen in any given year
during the state of emergency.126 Especially after Operation Anvil in 1954, the acquisition of
firearms became a major focus of Mau Mau raids.127 As Itote states, “At times our shortage of
weapons made our activities seem like a series of battles to get weapons to fight more battles.”128
Raids for weapons and supplies became the chief operational method for Mau Mau
fighters. Since they had to leave the forest for a raid, they were also the most dangerous
operations to undertake. While in the forest, the Mau Mau were able to move about silently and
keep out of sight. This forced British and colonial troops to search the Mau Mau out, often with
little success. According to oral histories conducted in the 1980s of former KAR British officers,
forest patrols rarely encountered any Mau Mau fighters. In their opinion, the area was too vast
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and their numbers too small to cover it effectively.129 However, when the Mau Mau raided urban
areas, contact between both sides was commonplace.
Two of the more infamous raids are the attacks on the Naivasha Police station in 1953
and the Lukenya Prison in1954. Dedan Kimathi, the highest ranked Mau Mau fighter in the
Aberdares, led the raid on Naivasha. In this single raid, the Mau Mau obtained forty-seven
precision weapons, including eighteen machine guns, and 3,780 rounds of ammunition.130 The
attack on the Naivasha Police Station proved to be the most successful raid pulled off by the Mau
Mau during the Uprising. It also cemented the status of Kimathi as the military leader of the
forest fighters. The raid on Lukenya Prison, while not as successful as Naivasha, was the largest
raid put together by Mau Mau fighters active in Nairobi. The Mau Mau committed three of their
generals and over one hundred fighters to this raid. With them, they carried thirty rifles, six Bren
submachine guns, and five pistols. The raid was a great show of force and led to the acquisition
of weapons, ammunition, and uniforms.131
Not all raids were as successful though. Many proved to be more trouble than they were
worth. Of these, the failed raid in near Mathira in January of 1954 hurt the Mau Mau cause
unlike any other. During the preparations for this raid, government forces wounded and captured
Waruhiu Itote, then known as General China. Colonial police and a KAR battalion discovered
Itote and his men; at that point, a firefight erupted.132 Because of a chronic precision firearms
shortage, the Mau Mau risked much to obtain more guns. Not only did this failed raid remove
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Itote from the battlefield, but also, because he survived, it allowed him to become an intelligence
asset for the British. In an interrogation that lasted sixty-eight hours, Itote divulged the inner
working of the Mau Mau organization.133 It was the single greatest intelligence achievement of
the conflict. In an attempt to expand their military forces, the Mau Mau lost one of their most
experienced generals.

Close Quarters Combat
As discussed in the previous chapter, the decreasing ability to acquire precision firearms
was one of the causal factors that drove the Mau Mau to develop their homemade guns. Just as
the scarcity of these weapons dictated raiding tactics, so too did the homemade firearms. The
smoothbore of the homemade gun required the operator to fire at close range.134 Additionally,
most of the homemade weapons required manual reloading. After each successive shot, the
danger of an accidental discharge increased. This is because the increase in the weapon’s
temperature could prematurely detonate the gunpowder in a cartridge. Not only could this cause
the gun to fire when the shooter was not ready, it could also injure the shooter or a comrade.135
Mau Mau leadership took all these potential dangers into consideration when it came to
the tactical implementation of these homemade firearms. According to Henry Wachanga, a Mau
Mau fighter in the Aberdares, there were several standing orders regarding firearm usage. For
example, no one was to fire any rounds unless ordered to by a superior. This helped to ensure
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the element of surprise in an ambush or raid. Once given the order to fire, Mau Mau fighters
fired only one round, unless specifically ordered otherwise. This helped to mitigate the dangers
of an accidental discharge and conserve limited ammunition. Each fighter carried five rounds of
spare ammunition. These extra rounds were only for pressing a victory or covering a retreat.
Lastly, the loss of a weapon was punishable by death.136 It is hard to know how rigidly Mau
Mau leaders enforced these rules. It does seem clear from the oral histories of British soldiers
that the Mau Mau preferred ambushes and broke contact quickly.137
Within the forest, the ambush was the Mau Mau tactic of choice for engaging with their
enemy. A common method of guerilla forces around the world, ambushes allowed the Mau Mau
to dictate the location and duration of contact. This ability is important when fighting an enemy
with superior weaponry and technology. In The Swords of Kirinyaga, Henry Wachanga
described the typical Mau Mau ambush,
We would ambush them with ease, for we placed guards at all entrances into the
forest. When the enemy approached, these guards would move quickly away and
report the number of approaching enemy and the type of weapons they carried.
The leader would then delegate a number larger than that of the enemy to ambush
them. The remainder of the Mau Mau would then go to about half a mile from
camp, leaving only sentinels to mark whether or not the enemy discovered the
camp. The ambush would be quickly laid along the foot-path the enemy was
using. It would be at a place of dense forest which afforded good cover. The
Mau Mau Fighters would hide very close to the path at regular intervals. One
ambusher would be placed about one hundred yards farther along the path. He
would be armed with a .303 rifle with a tin can attached to the muzzle. When
fired, it sounded like a mortar and made the enemies drop to the ground very
quickly. He would not fire until the enemies were all even with the Mau Mau
hiding along the path. After he fired his single shot, and the security forces
dropped down, the Mau Mau along the path leaped from their hiding places and
either opened fire at close range, or slashed them with their mabanga. A man
136
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with a bugle was the first man along our line of hidden Mau Mau. He began to
blow the bugle as the ambush began. Should any soldier attempt to scape h would
be thrown into confusion and plunge deeper into the forest rather than run towards
the bugler. The forest was like a house to us, but was a torture chamber to the
security forces.138
Within this scenario, Wachanga demonstrates Mau Mau tactical superiority and control of the
battlefield within the forest. Two key factors that create this situation for the Mau Mau are
knowledge of the terrain and intelligence of the enemy situation. As a guerilla force fighting in
their homeland, the Mau Mau have natural terrain knowledge. Wachanga details this asset when
he talks of guards at the forest entrances, the Mau Mau’s ability to know the security force’s path
of travel, the use of the densest section of that path for cover and concealment, and the scattering
of security forces deeper into the forest. The guards also act as intelligence collectors when they
report to their leader the size and armament of the approaching force. This intelligence report
allows the Mau Mau leadership to decide whether to engage their enemy and deploy their forces
appropriately. It is important to note that Wachanga states that Mau Mau leadership deployed a
larger force than the one approaching. Arguably, this was not always possible. One surmises
that if fighter suppository was not possible, the Mau Mau remained hidden.
In Wachanga’s scenario, however, the Mau Mau set up and sprung the ambush. He
describes a basic linear ambush. In such an ambush, the assault team lines up along the enemy’s
avenue of approach. Security units protect the assault team’s flanks and rear. When the enemy
enters the kill zone, the assault team opens fire and engages the enemy.139 In addition to these
standard tactics, Mau Mau ambushes contained some unique aspects as well. The simulated
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mortar fire helped to close a gap in fire support. As Wachanga described, the sound of mortar
fire was enough to make security forces take cover and signal the assault team to open fire. It is
likely that the firearms used by the bulk of the assault team were homemade. Wachanga alludes
to them when describing the ambush taking place at close range and the use of mabangas, a type
of machete. The bugler is a third unique aspect. The standard linear ambush can use a support
element to press a victory within the kill zone.140 The bugler, like the simulated mortar, serves as
a faint of such a support unit. The bugler tricks the security forces into thinking they cannot
escape in the direction they came because more Mau Mau could be in that direction. Therefore,
to flee the kill zone, they disperse into the deeper areas of the forest. The bugler creates
uncertainty and confusion, increasing the Mau Mau ambush effectiveness. Despite the Mau
Mau’s fire and technology inferiority, their use of terrain, intelligence, and buglers allowed them
to create a torture chamber in the forest.

The Dichotomy of the Homemade Guns
Because senior Mau Mau leadership largely rested in the Militant Wing after October
1952, larger political goals took a back seat to military objectives. This is not to say that military
leadership was not ideological, in fact this led to many disagreements at the highest levels, but
prosecuting an insurgency from the forests prevented ideological leaders from achieving political
goals in urban areas. Effective counter-insurgency methods enacted by the British further
hemmed in Mau Mau military capabilities. These factors drove the KLFA to take increasingly
risky actions at the tactical level, often for not much reward. Despite their logistical and
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engineering abilities to craft and field homemade firearms, the need for precision weaponry and
ammunition became an overarching priority for Mau Mau leadership. The need for precision
weaponry influenced the type of offensive mission Mau Mau fighters undertook and their
homemade guns narrowed the scope of their capabilities within said mission. Within the forest,
Mau Mua fighters held the tactical advantage. Their ability to ambush British patrols left the
forests as the last held terrain of the Mau Mau Uprising. Forest ambushes, however, were
defensive maneuvers. They relied on the British patrolling into a kill zone. As Mau Mau
numbers declined, less contact occurred in this manner. The arms and ammunition expended in
ambushes drove the Mau Mau to conduct offensive raids to supply defensive ambushes. Thus,
the homemade guns fostered a dichotomy between tactical abilities and strategic goals. The
chronic lack of precision weaponry created a space for the homemade gun to flourish, but at the
cost of broader strategic capabilities.

51

CHAPTER THREE: HISTORICAL MEMORY OF THE
HOMEMADE GUNS
Historians began to take notice of memory in the 1980s, following a growth in public
interest for autobiography, family genealogical history, and museum studies.141 As historical
memory gained use professionally, scholars debated its usefulness and accuracy. Supporters of
using historical memory saw a way to engage with new sources and amplify their research.
Detractors saw subjective information that flew in the face of objective historical research.142 In
many ways, historians of Africa have embraced historical memory. African peoples have a rich
oral tradition that has passed a collective memory down through generations. Scholars who
pursued this as a source found ways to fill gaps in the traditional historical record. Jan Vansina
developed the methodology for studying oral tradition and treating it as history. Published in
1985, his Oral Tradition as History laid the foundation for all subsequent studies of African oral
history.143 Anne Bailey used this type of research to great effect in her study of Eweland on the
former Slave Coast of Africa. She used oral tradition and collective memory to add to the
history of the Atlantic Slave Trade.144
Memory and oral history are also useful when groups or individuals destroy traditional
historical sources. This was the case of Caroline Elkins’ research in Kenya. While researching
Imperial Reckoning, she discovered that when the British left Kenya they destroyed their records
on a grand scale. This left her with many questions regarding the detention complex the British
established during the Mau Mau Emergency. She interviewed hundreds of former Mau Mau
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adherents to uncover their history.145 For the purpose of this thesis, I used memoirs and oral
histories to place the homemade guns within the historical memory of Mau Mau. My research
demonstrates that the guns are, for different reasons, important to both Mau Mau and British
memory. I also attempted to strip away the extreme bias of both sides and find a balanced
memory of the guns.
Scholars have written academic works focusing on the historical memory of the Mau
Mau, but nothing specific to the memory of homemade guns. One excellent example is Robert
Buijtenhuijs’ Mau Mau Twenty Years After. In that work, he explored how the memory and myth
of Mau Mau influenced Kenyan politics and discourse in the two decades following
independence. Marshal S. Clough’s Mau Mau Memoirs is another groundbreaking work on this
subject. He used memoirs written by Mau Mau as primary sources and demonstrated how these
writers changed the traditional narrative of the Emergency. The research presented in this
chapter adopted a similar methodology. It too treated these memoirs as primary sources.
Secondary sources, such as Clough and Buijtenhuijs, served to amplify detail and context. This
chapter also analyzes recorded oral histories from British veterans who fought the Mau Mau.
While there are several British Mau Mau memoirs, some of which this thesis cites, I believe
these recorded oral histories serve as a more direct link to British historical memory of Mau
Mau. These two type of primary sources help to make a new contribution to the secondary
source literature.
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Memoirs by Mau Mau
This section analyzes the treatment of the homemade guns in memoirs written by former
Mau Mau. Focus on these memoirs is important because it is necessary to hear the voices of
individuals who used these weapons. The memoirs of interest to this section are Mau Mau
Detainee by Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, Mau Mau from Within by Karari Njama, and Mau Mau
General by Waruhiu Itote.146 Published in the immediate decade following the close of the
Emergency and Kenya’s independence, these works offer firsthand accounts and opinions of the
homemade firearms. Not only are these three works in conversation with one another, but they
also directly and indirectly address the standardized Mau Mau narrative of the time. This thesis
has relied on these sources in earlier chapters. In those cases, they served to explain the
construction, need for, and use of homemade firearms. For the purposes of this chapter, these
works serve as primary sources of memory to explain the Mau Mau recollection of these
weapons.
During and shortly after the Mau Mau Uprising, the British and other outsiders controlled
the narrative of Mau Mau and Kenyan memory. Early reports, such as F. D. Corfield’s 1960
historical survey Origins and Growth of Mau Mau, attempted to cement the West’s
understanding of what took place during the conflict. His report claimed that the Uprising
stemmed from, what he saw as, the typical friction associated with an uncivilized group
encountering a civilizing force. He believed the speed with which the civilizing process took
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place is what exacerbated this friction into outright conflict. Corfield does acknowledge the land
dispute at the center of the Mau Mau cause, but he attributes the movement’s violence to its
adherent’s primitive tribal nature.147 When Corfield addresses the homemade guns, he treats
them as almost an afterthought in a larger chapter about firearms. He provides a factual
description of their construction and then editorializes their performance and effectiveness.148 In
general, his report offered statistics and a detailed explanation of events from the British
perspective but furthered the Western idea of primitive Africans unwilling to accept civilization.
Regarding the homemade guns, he labeled them as a means of attaining “Dutch courage,”149
despite their ubiquity on the battlefield.
However, with the arrival of Kenya’s independence, the Mau Mau themselves began to
offer a rebuttal to the British-centric narrative. These refutations took the form of memoirs, in
which Kikuyu Kenyans offered their perspective of events and, often, exposed atrocities
perpetrated by the British. Because of their boldness and detail from the Mau Mau side of the
story, these memoirs regularly gained the attention of readers outside of Kenya and became a
form of political discourse within it.150
Mau Mau Detainee was the first of this kind of memoir. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki artfully
described his life in the early days of the movement and the seven years he spent as a prisoner in
fourteen different detention camps within Kenya.151 Detainee tore at the very foundation of
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academic and political thought on the Mau Mau movement and the Emergency. Kariuki even
took issue with the use of Mau Mau as a name of the movement. 152 When he used the term, he
placed it within quotation marks to highlight this point. Kariuki’s dedication to reclaiming the
language of Mau Mau runs throughout his memoir. No longer were adherents “terrorists” or
“gangsters.” Kariuki recast them as “freedom fighters.” Kenyan politicians looking to ingratiate
themselves to former Mau Mau after independence often took up this language. This practice
still holds true today and demonstrates Detainee’s lasting influence on Kenyan political culture.
Kariuki became politically active in the movement in the early days of the Uprising. He
served as a liaison and procurement officer prior to his detainment. The hotel he operated in
Nakuru served as a front in support of his efforts. Government forces detained Kariuki in his
hotel on October 28, 1953, just over a year after the British declaration of the Emergency.153
Despite his early detention, Kariuki remained engaged in the movement. He gained knowledge
of the fighting and methods of firearms manufacturing from contact with other prisoners. He
makes it clear that the procurement of arms and ammunition were of the highest priority for the
Mau Mau but offers a defensive motive for this goal. From his perspective, the need for firearms
was due to the overwhelming military response of the British. To explain his point, Kariuki
relates a Kikuyu parable. He likens the Mau Mau to children tossing a panga, a type of machete,
at an adult who responds by skillfully throwing it back at the child.154 Therefore, according to
Kariuki, had the British not responded with machine guns and aerial bombs, the Mau Mau would
not have stolen and built firearms to refit their initial armament of knives and spears. Just as
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Kariuki recast the language regarding Mau Mau, he repurposed the need and use of the
homemade guns. This placed the homemade guns within the context of a defensive last resort,
rather than a means of bolstering up the courage of fighters, as Corfield claimed.
Additionally, Kariuki uses the homemade guns as one of the dividing lines between two
factions within the Militant Wing of the movement. The KLFA was the organized military
effort. The Komerera, on the other hand, were more akin to a militia. While the KLFA had rank
structure, discipline, and a logistical network, the Komerera were a less organized unit. They
acted more desperately to procure food and weapons. The KLFA set up regular camps deep
within the forests, whereas the Komerera hid within the Reserves and the edges of the forests.
According to Kariuki, the KLFA fought the war as cleanly as a group could, but he laid the
preponderance of Mau Mau atrocities at the feet of the Komerera.155 In Kariuki’s eyes, the
KLFA was a noble force with the means and ability to set up firearm factories in the forests and
mountains. He disparagingly states that the Komerera “did not have the skill to make their own
guns,” likening them to a rabble who would kill their own to acquire food and supplies156
Kariuki established an interesting dichotomy and, in doing so, struck at the monolithic structure
of the Mau Mau favored by the British.
In 1966, three years after the publication of Mau Mau Detainee, a second memoir
contributed to the Kenyan side of the story. Unlike Kariuki, however, Karari Njama did fight in
the forest and relied on homemade firearms to advance the cause. Mau Mau from Within
detailed the extensive experiences of Njama during his time as a guerilla fighter the Aberdares.
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Njama was born in 1926 to a “squatter” family in the Rift Valley. “Squatters” lived a feudalistic
life on land stolen from them by white European settlers.157 When Njama was twelve years old,
he began his formal education at a nearby school. When his father died, he left school and went
to live in the reserves. Though he only attended school for two years, he made the most of it. He
became an avid reader and even worked for a short time as a teacher.158 No doubt his literacy
and formal education helped place Njama at the side of Dedan Kimathi. In addition to serving as
the Field Marshal’s secretary, Njama operated as a liaison officer between the scattered
commands and camps in the Aberdares Range.159 As a liaison officer, Njama traveled between
camps, relaying orders from Kimathi and conducting inspections. During his inspections, he
often remarked about homemade guns or, as he called them, banda.160
According to Njama, Kimathi had a great interest in manufacturing firearms. Njama
recorded an example of this at a five-day meeting of Mau Mau leadership at Mwathe. This
meeting took place in August 1953, just ten months after the Declaration of Emergency. During
that period, Mau Mau fighters operated in an ad hoc way. The leadership within the Aberdares
region decided to institute some level of organization and unified command. Most of their
decisions confirmed what developed organically, but they also solidified areas of responsibility

157

Though a European model, settler colonists brought some feudalistic practices to Kenya. The colonists saw
squatting as a way to cultivate large tracts of land without incurring the full costs. They allowed the native Kenyan
squatters to remain on their land in return for payment, typically in the form of crops or livestock. Sometimes the
landowner chose to develop the land for his own use. Such actions typically forced the squatters into the Reserves.
This practice was a chief grievance of the Mau Mau Land and Freedom Army.
158
Barnett and Njama. Mau Mau from Within , 81-82, 88-89.
159
Clough, Mau Mau Memoirs, 11.
160
Barnett and Njama, Mau Mau from Within, 493. Banda is term used by the forest guerillas for their homemade
guns.

58

and rank structure.161 During this important time, Kimathi instructed his generals on the priority
of manufacturing firearms. According to Njama, Kimathi ordered,
I want to see every warrior with a gun and you must work hard to achieve this in
as short a time as possible. You must collect dues from our members, as much as
you can, and spare the money for buying ammunition, medicine, clothing,
stationary, and guns-factory equipment. It has been reported to me that an
excellent blacksmith has entered the forest in the Ruthani area and that he can
make guns with no difference from the manufactured ones. We would be very
glad and if this proved true we would require a smith for every camp to get
together and be taught by him. I hope that this would improve and quicken our
supply of arms.162
In the days before he said this, Kimathi gained official recognition as the supreme commander of
the Aberdares region and the entire KLFA. His desire to take time to express the importance of
making guns and suggesting ways to do it, demonstrates the importance of these weapons to the
movement.
In addition to this, Njama provides other instances of Kimathi and his headquarters
issuing orders regarding homemade guns. For example, two months prior to the Mwathe
meeting, Kimathi sent a written order to the various leaders within his region. The order was
regarding a planned raid. It contained seven points on how to conduct the raid. In the seventh
point, Kimathi ordered his guerillas to seize all available water pipe in the area. Specifically,
sizes one and a half to three quarters inch in diameter. The express purpose for this pipe was for
making gun barrels.163 As noted in Chapter Two of this thesis, a water pipe was the most
common type of material used for the construction of a homemade gun’s barrel. A second
example comes from the headquarters camp at Kariaini. The headquarters ordered, likely at the
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behest of Kimathi, that guerillas were to obtain from nearby reserves the necessary tools and
equipment to construct gun factories.164 Njama’s recollections demonstrate that the methods of
gun manufacture interested the highest levels of Mau Mau leadership. While many of the
weapons appeared as simplistic and haphazard to the British, much thought and planning lay
behind their construction.
Despite their importance to the KLFA’s military effort, the drawbacks to these guns exist
in Mau Mau memory as well. In Mau Mau from Within, Njama recalls a negative personal
experience with a banda. One afternoon, Njama volunteered for sentry duty and posted up at a
stream crossing near camp. As the day wore on, a thick mist reduced his visibility to fifty yards.
After some time, a small enemy force entered the area. Njama, armed with a homemade gun,
took aim at his enemy. He pulled the trigger, but the weapon misfired. He cocked the weapon
again and attempted to fire a second time. The gun failed again. He then moved to a new
position, loaded a fresh round and tried a third time. Nothing. After this third misfire, Njama
fled the area to warn his comrades.165
Njama’s story is quite remarkable; he was lucky to escape the area with his life.
Throughout his memoir, Njama says positive things about homemade guns. This story is a rare
exception. One reason for telling it may have to do with what happened the following day.
While he did disparage that particular weapon, he still held faith in the gun-manufacturing plan.
The next day, he told some fellow guerillas about his experience. He showed them the weapon
and pulled the trigger. This time the gun fired. The men inspected the firearm and decided that
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the moisture from the mist prevented the spring from operating correctly. According to Njama,
the guerillas told him they distrusted the homemade guns because of such problems. Njama
reassured them that, while his weapon failed, the majority of their banda operated just fine,
especially in good weather.166
This anecdote serves more than one purpose. At the time of the incident, it reassured his
comrades that the homemade guns were useful tools. Regarding historical memory, Njama
reinforces his support of Kimathi’s gun manufacturing plans. Since his execution in 1957,
Kimathi gained the status of a martyr. Njama was politically wise to remain supportive of
something he saw as a Kimathi initiative. Mau Mau from Within, while lengthy and full of
detail, is mostly restricted to the Aberdares region of the rebellion. The other key forest theater
was Mount Kenya. For that region, it is necessary to turn to General China.
Waruhiu Itote, known as General China, is a fountain of information about the
homemade guns of the Mau Mau. Because of his direct involvement with the first examples of
homemade guns, his memoir, Mau Mau General, and his Interrogation Report reside at the
center of this thesis. Itote does not credit himself with the idea of manufacturing guns in the
forest, he attributes that to General Tanganyika, but he may well be the midwife of the
invention.167 As the most prominent Mau Mau leader to write a memoir, he provides excellent
insight for historical memory purposes.
According to Itote, the first homemade gun experiments took place on Mount Kenya in
early 1953. He and Tanganyika detonated a .303 caliber round with a nail.168 That risky
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procedure was a fitting start to the process. It demonstrated the great need for firearms in the
early months of open warfare and the lengths certain people were willing to go to make up the
gap. Itote talks of the excitement shared when their experiment worked and, though sparsely
written, this enthusiasm comes across nearly seventy years later. Itote also names the first two
gunmakers as Ngoma and Waiwai. These men created the first two working prototypes. Itote
sent the two guns to Dedan Kimathi for inspection. Kimathi praised them and, to Itote’s
displeasure, sent the guns to Mau Mau fighters in the reserves.169 This is likely when Kimathi
developed his enthusiasm for homemade guns that Njama expresses in his memoir.
Once his Mount Kenya factory was up and running, Itote reports rapid advances with the
manufacturing process and in the quality of the final product. According to Itote,
Twenty experts began work with me, and each company sent another twenty for
training. Ruku, a young man from Murang’a, was in charge of the operation, and
no weapon could leave the factory until he signed a release order. His assistants
included Mukungi of North Tetu; Kamirigiti from Nanyuki; Kamwana from
Mathira; and our original inventors, Waiwai and Ngoma Kagio. As more and
more people learnt how to make guns, it was no longer possible to pinpoint any
invention or innovation as being the work of one particular person. At the same
time, and perhaps more than anything else, the proliferation of this skill and its
improvement demonstrated that our men were equal in intelligence to anyone.
Had we had the opportunities, many of us would have gone far in such fields as
engineering.170
Itote describes nothing but success. A key takeaway from this statement is the pride Itote had in
his engineers. Throughout Kenya’s colonial period, the British held back the Kikuyu and other
indigenous peoples. The majority of them became alienated farmers, forced to squat on land
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they once owned or move into reserves. As the British brought technological advances, they
allowed relatively few Kikuyu into these areas of expertise. Itote is keenly aware of the
perception of his people held by Western readers, thus his point about equal intelligence and
opportunities.
It is also important to understand the body of Mau Mau General only describes the
beginning of gun factories on Mount Kenya. The appendices of Itote’s memoir and his
interrogation by Ian Henderson provide amplifying detail. Itote started with this small cadre and,
in about a year’s time, developed a network of factories servicing forty companies within his
Hikahika Battalion.171 The main factory remained under his command at his Barafu 25
Headquarters. Itote claims over 500 forest fighters guarded this one factory. In it, engineers
turned out an average of forty-two guns per week.172 In addition to manufacturing firearms, it
served as the schoolhouse for future gunmakers. Itote sent these graduates to engineer units at
the company level on Mount Kenya or into the Passive Wing. Passive Wing gunmakers operated
“one-man factories” in the reserves. Between May 1953 and his capture in January of 1954,
Itote claimed around 400 such engineers received training to operate in the reserves.173 In this
case, Itote’s 1954 interrogation substantiates his 1967 memoir, therefore, increasing the
credibility of his claims.
Analyzing Mau Mau from Within and Mau Mau Genreal together highlights the bias of
memoirs and the nuance required when using them as primary historical sources. Because of the
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credibility of the relevant portions of Itote’s memoir, it seems he does not receive the credit due
to him in Mau Mau from Within. This creates an interesting disagreement within Mau Mau
historical memory. Based on Itote’s memory and his interrogation, it appears that the Barafu 25
factory was up and running well before Kimathi’s orders at the Mwathe meeting. Therefore,
Itote and his Mount Kenya factory network led the way on the actual manufacture of firearms.
Kimathi’s Aberdares factories had to play catchup after his August 1953 order. Njama does not
ignore Itote entirely, but when he mentions the general, it is not in relation to homemade guns.
This omission is likely two-fold. First, Njama is a Kimathi acolyte and never served under Itote.
As noted above, he remained a loyal Kimathi promoter after the field marshal’s execution in
1957. Second, Njama potentially still saw Itote as a collaborator in 1966, the year he published
Mau Mau from Within. The fact that Itote experienced success in the Kenyatta administration
may have increased Njama bitterness towards someone who he saw as a disgraced Mau Mau
leader.174
All three memoirs mentioned above offer a different Mau Mau perspective of the
conflict. Their differing points of view added layers to a narrative that, at the time, was much less
complicated. On the other hand, reports, such as Corfield’s, and other Western works placed the
Mau Mau on a spectrum ranging from “savage” to “menace.” Kariuki stretched that spectrum all
the way out to “freedom fighter,” thus forever changing the language of Mau Mau. His use of
the homemade guns as a dividing line between the KLFA and the Komerera did much the same.
Clearly, he did not view all Mau Mau fighters equally. Njama’s work recalls the spread and use
of banda within the Aberdares region. For reasons previously argued, he accredited Kimathi
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with much of this proliferation. Njama’s experience with a faulty gun added a dose of lethal
reality to this dangerous program. The memoir and interrogation of Itote added a timeline,
names, and organization to the memory narrative. He explained not only why the Mau Mau
needed to create their own guns, but also how they did so. One cannot say that without Itote,
there would be no homemade guns. However, based on his account, it is hard to see how they
could have become the primary firearm of the movement without him. The disagreements
between Njama and Itote introduce political and geographical differences to the narrative. Taken
as a whole though, it is clear that homemade guns are an important aspect to Mau Mau fighters
and their historical memory narrative. Another group had firsthand experience with these guns.
The next section focuses on their perspective.

Oral Histories of British Veterans of the Mau Mau Uprising
The IWM archives contain a number of oral history interviews related to Mau Mau. Oral
history is an important aspect of historical memory. It serves as an avenue for historians to
capture the stories of individuals that experienced historical events. The IWM’s Mau Mau oral
histories are audio recordings. The recordings of interest to this thesis feature interviews with
British regular army officers, KAR troops, and civil servants that were present in Kenya during
the State of Emergency. While the histories offer a great variety in experience, rank, and type of
service, they only offer the British perspective. The museum’s lack of Mau Mau or loyalist
Kikuyu oral histories is a glaring loss to the record. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the
oral histories available can serve as a counter perspective to the memoirs discussed above. The
histories selected feature direct commentary on homemade firearms.
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On September 12, 1956, Detainee 1540 penned a letter to the Officer in Charge of the
Mathira Works Camp. According to his letter, he surrendered to Government forces as a Mau
Mau fighter and confessed to his crimes. His real name was Simon Peter Ngatia Macheria, but
he admitted to being the gunmaker known as General Doctor Russia. The man he wrote this
letter to was Terrance John Image.175 In 1991, Image provided an oral history to the IWM. In
that interview, he discussed his time as a prison officer in Kenya during the Mau Mau
Uprising.176 Image arrived in Kenya in January 1956. His first post was to a convict prison in
the northern part of the colony. He recalls only one Mau Mau detainee within that prison. The
rest were individuals convicted of non-Mau Mau crimes.177
By late 1956, he was the commandant of the Mathira Works Camp at Karatina. Unlike
his previous posting, this camp dealt strictly with Mau Mau detainees. According to his
interview, he was in charge of the administration of the camp, not of the rehabilitation of Mau
Mau insurgents. Image makes it clear that the British and loyal Kikuyu who dealt with
rehabilitation were separate from his own prison officers.178 This distinction is noteworthy. The
rehabilitation process is fraught with charges of abuse and improper treatment of individuals
believed to be Mau Mau adherents.179 In fact, the crux of Macheria’s letter to Image refers to ill
treatment and confinement. Macheria reiterates that he surrendered under amnesty and showed
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government forces his camp and gun factory.180 Image claimed that detainees often wrote to him
as commandant to seek better treatment and to demonstrate that they no longer abided by their
oaths as Mau Mau.181 It is possible that Macheria’s abilities as a gun maker prevented him from
enjoying the benefits of amnesty. He built at least one homemade gun housed at the IWM. It is
one of the more sophisticated examples in their collection. It features a working bolt action,
magazine, and trigger.182 Based on this evidence, Macheria was very skilled at his craft. Image
provided the letter to the IWM archives, but it is unclear if he intervened in the detention of
Macheria. Image’s oral history as a prison officer stands out among the collection at IWM.
Because of the difficult history surrounding the prison system in Kenya, few people involved
may have been willing to discuss their time there. It is fortunate that Image decided to tell his
story. Among other aspects, he provides an excellent memory of a Westerner interacting with a
Mau Mau gun maker.
The majority of the IWM’s Mau Mau oral histories come from soldiers who served in
Kenya during the Emergency. These histories are important to Mau Mau historical memory
because they provide the point of view of men who engaged directly with the Mau Mau. Great
Britain relied on a variety of forces to put down the Uprising. In addition to colonial forces
based within Kenya, such as the KAR, they deployed British Army Regulars.183 These soldiers
came primarily from the Devonshire Regiment (The Devons) and the Royal East Kent Regiment
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(The Buffs). John Pomeroy Randle and Dennis James Dell served in these units and deployed to
Kenya.
John Randle was an officer with the Devons in Kenya between 1953 and 1955.184 During
his interview, he discussed search and destroy procedures for flushing out Mau Mau forest
fighters. Randle’s unit operated in the Aberdares and spent two or three days at a time in the
forest. While there, he and his men patrolled in squads within predesignated areas. When they
encountered Mau Mau activity, his platoon rallied to that location.185 This type of patrolling to
contact is a tactic used in counterinsurgency when small units are responsible for large areas.
Most of the time they did not encounter actual Mau Mau fighters on these patrols.186 This is not
too surprising. The tactics his unit employed allowed the Mau Mau to determine contact. When
they came across a Mau Mau camp or cache, they collected or destroyed whatever weapons,
supplies, and intelligence available.187 Randle does not mention finding homemade guns
specifically, however, Dennis Dell does remember them.
As an enlisted man, Dell served with the Buffs from 1961 to 1962.188 He and his men
used very similar tactics to Randle. Despite the fact that this was in the year preceding
independence, British troops still operated against the remaining Mau Mau forces in the colony.
According to Dell, the Buffs searched the reserves and forests for weaponry and other
contraband. Dell recalls regularly finding homemade guns. He remarks that they seemed more
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dangerous to the shooter than his intended target.189 In fact, many of the oral histories from
white KAR soldiers express a similar idea as well.190 Were they really that dangerous and
useless?

Balancing the Historical Memory of the Banda
It is clear that British soldiers’ negative sentiments have influenced historical memory of
the guns. The reasons for this are manifold. The British effectively suppressed the Mau Mau
Uprising. Whether or not the Mau Mau helped to achieve Kenyan independence often receives a
political response rather than a historical one. The British were also the first to make a historical
argument regarding the Mau Mau and their homemade guns. The Corfield Report and early
academic writings told the British side of the story. Memoirs written by former Mau Mau
responded to a narrative that the West already believed. This is a case of the collective memory
of one side outweighing the other. How can one find a balance to determine a more accurate
historical memory?
It is true that the homemade guns could harm their shooter. One of the examples held at
the IWM demonstrates this. This particular gun has a ruptured chamber. It appears that when its
user attempted to fire, the bullet exploded in the chamber, potentially injuring the user.191 The
anecdote of Njama’s three misfires is another example of a weapon malfunction. Obviously, the
use of any homemade or improvised weapon poses a significant threat to the one wielding it.
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However, the level of danger that the British remember does not seem to bare out in memories of
the Mau Mau themselves. In the works reviewed in this chapter, the Mau Mau extol these
weapons. The sheer number of homemade weapons used in the field also counters the British
recollection. The goal of leaders like Itote and Kimathi was to force out the British from Kenya.
They believed homemade guns would provide them a way to achieve this goal. If the guns were
as dangerous as the British remember them to be, then why did the Mau Mau leadership want
them in the hands of every freedom fighter? Itote himself saw deficiencies in their mission
objectives. It is a giant leap, however, to assume Mau Mau leadership purposely armed their
fighters with weapons that helped their enemies more than it hurt them. Based on Itote’s memoir
and the different examples housed at the IWM, the dangers present in early models likely
decreased over time. As gunmakers, like Macheria, became more proficient in their craft, their
ability to overcome earlier deficiencies developed as well. The British memory of the guns most
likely demonstrates a shared memory of something they dismissed as a poor excuse for a firearm.
British collective memory also shows racial bias against their African adversaries. The positive
bias of the memory held by the Mau Mau cancels out this negative bias of the British. The
balance of the historical memory suggests that the guns were, overall, useful and effective tools
at the tactical level. While they did not close the firepower gap between the belligerents, these
guns helped narrow it. In addition, they should be remembered as a unique demonstration of
ingenuity and resourcefulness in a time of rebellion and decolonization.
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CONCLUSION
In the early days of their uprising, the Mau Mau could not field enough weapons to arm
the KLFA. Theft and left behind firearms did not fill the gap. Strict firearms laws enacted and
enforced by the British Colonial Government exacerbated the firearms gap. Unlike other
liberation movements of the time, Mau Mau did not earn support from an outside group. Instead
of their military aspirations dying on the vine, they engineered a way to build their own firearms.
Designed by intelligent and creative individuals, Mau Mau gunmakers built these weapons out of
Kenya itself. Trees from its forest, pipes from its infrastructure, and springs from its urban
centers. In the hands of a Mau Mau forest fighter, as the primary type of firearm in the
movement, it became a deadly item of pride and status. Their lethality gained the respect of the
Mau Mau’s adversary.
As colonial troops fighting under the flag of Great Britain during the Second World War,
future Mau Mau leaders experienced the world beyond Kenya. Some saw combat in the Far
East, but most of these Kikuyu soldiers served a clerks and logisticians. These were the
necessary skills to source and deploy their improvised firearm. It was these less glorious, but no
less important, aspects of warfare that informed the Mau Mau generals. When the Uprising
came, the KLFA developed their strategic goals of an independent Kenya. However, their
battles took place at the tactical level. Their chronic firearms shortage relegated much of their
offensive operations to weapon raids. Armed with their homemade guns, they enforced strict
rules of engagement to maximize surprise and minimize the dangers of their own weapons.
Within the forests and foothills, the KLFA waged a defensive guerilla campaign. Masters of the
bush, they determined when and where they would meet their enemy. Through ingenuity and
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creativity, they turned simple ambushes into torture chambers for the British. Yet, the tactical
success that their homemade guns gained them, limited their ability to achieve strategic goals.
Eventually, the counter-insurgency techniques of the British pushed the remaining hardcore of
the Mau Mau deep into the forest. Forcing Mau Mau fighters into desperation, many were
captured or killed venturing out for food, while others surrendered and served in pseudo-gangs.
The homemade guns remain central in Mau Mau memory and hold a prominent place in
their memoirs. Detainees, soldiers, and generals knew of the guns’ importance to the movement.
They remember the pride and danger of using their banda. The British, too, remember these
guns. They discovered them in weapons caches and lying in wait for them in ambushes. Not
surprisingly, they had a low opinion of such a rudimentary weapon. But this opinion does not
counter the fact that the guns displayed ingenuity and resourcefulness. Homemade guns
narrowed the firepower gap in a lopsided conflict.
In November 1971, a Mau Mau veterans organization gathered at a solidarity meeting
held for President Jomo Kenyatta. The members dressed in the garb of the forest fighter, clothes
of animal skin and dreadlocked hair. They attended the meeting on behalf of the Kenyatta
government to rally ex-Mau Mau to his Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) party. This, and
other groups like it, acted as special interest and lobbyist groups for various reforms in Kenya.
After nearly a decade of independence, Kenyatta and his party actively sought the support of
Mau Mau veteran groups. While there, the group posed for a photograph and held a large sign
that read in part, “…MAU MAU IS STILL ALIVE / HANG ALL CONSPIRATORS. WE ARE
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READY WITH / OUR PANGAS AND OUR HOME MADE GUNS…”192 Taken at face value,
these veterans were ready to physically enforce their views in a way only the Mau Mau could.
The specific reference to homemade guns demonstrates their cultural importance. They are,
indeed, the calling card of the Mau Mau, an item unique to their struggle for land and freedom.
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